

DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS IN COMPENSATING OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OVER THE LAST YEAR

Jeffrey M. Kanter Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc. September 7, 2005

Current Environment



ON THE SURFACE

New mood of caution and restraint . . .

- Concern for restoring public and employee trust
- Greater accountability and control in the hands of compensation committees and their advisors
- Investor groups and their representatives (ISS and Glass-Lewis) more influential
 - Exposing and ratcheting down practices outside the norm
 - Using the ballot box

Current Environment



BELOW THE SURFACE

Nothing close to true reform . . .

- Reliance on pay surveys continues as justification for high pay
- Inflated option "Black-Scholes" values are being converted to real money and embedded in competitive compensation
- Goal-setting is imprecise and prone to sandbagging, as evidenced by higher 2004 cash bonuses
- Little abatement in recruiting premiums for star talent, or excessive severance packages (most of which were set before SOX)
- Increased transparency of "total" compensation likely to exert future upward pressure



CONVERTING FROM OPTION TO FULL VALUE AWARDS

- 1,000 stock options @ \$50 with Black-Scholes of 60%
- Cost/value(?) of \$30,000 (1,000 X \$50 X .6)
- Math conversion = 600 shares of restricted stock ($$30,000 \div 50$)
- But need discount for differences in perceived value, generally 25-35%
- So, instead of 1.67:1, do 2.25:1 (450 shares) or 2.5:1 (400 shares)
- Employees happier; cost reduced from \$30,000 to \$22,000 or \$20,000



THE REALITY

5-year transition in executive compensation...

	1st Phase	2 nd Phase
Period	2002-03	2004-06
Catalysts	Sarbanes-Oxley, stock exchange rules, institutional investor initiatives	New FASB rules, option- valuation refinements, political/labor pressure
Focus	Corporate governance	Program design
Impact	Board compensation committee process	Use of stock options



MOST VISIBLE FACTORS INFLUENCING LT PROGRAMS

1. Exchange-based shareholder approval rules (2003)

- NASDAQ and NYSE now require shareholder approval of equity compensation plans
 - Eliminates "broad-based" plan and treasury exemptions (i.e., plans approved by the board, but not shareholders)
 - Retains exemption for new hire grants and shares granted in lieu of cash (i.e., voluntary deferred compensation)
- Requires shareholder approval of material amendments to equity plans, including stock option repricings
- <u>Implications</u> Balance of power dilution shifts to shareholders



MOST VISIBLE FACTORS INFLUENCING LT PROGRAMS

2. FASB accounting changes for equity-based compensation

- <u>Implications</u> Financial inefficiency:
 - 1. Accounting cost exceeds perceived value
 - Worse at lower levels
 - 2. Possibility of incurring earnings charges for awards that deliver little or no value to employees

DESIGN ALTERNATIVES

	Effect of New Accounting Standard	
Appreciation Awards	Negative	Positive
Stock Options (Plain Vanilla)	↓	
Incentive Stock Options (ISOs)		
"Reload" Stock Options		
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs)		
Premium-Priced Options/SARs*		
Cash-Settled SARs*	•	
Stock-Settled SARs*		1
Discount-Priced Options/SARs*		1
Performance-Vesting Options/SARs*		1
Price-Vesting Options/SARs*		
Full-Value Awards		
Performance Shares/Share Units		1
Restricted Stock/Stock Units	neut	tral
Other Awards		
LTI Cash (Performance Units)	neut	ral
Grants with Dividend Equivalents		
Grants without Dividend Equivalents		1

^{*} SARs are adversely affected by new nonqualified deferred compensation legislation



MOST VISIBLE FACTORS INFLUENCING LT PROGRAMS

3. SEC proxy disclosure project

- Expect project for enhanced disclosure:
 - Executives
 - SERP Expense
 - Option Value
 - Aircraft Costs
 - Deferred Interest
 - Other
 - <u>Directors</u>
 - Tabular Disclosure



MOST VISIBLE FACTORS INFLUENCING LT PROGRAMS

4. Deferred Compensation Taxation

- "Job Act" of 2004 Implication on
 - SARS/Discount Options
 - Option/RSU Deferrals
 - Deferral Election Timing
 - Subsequent Elections
 - In-service Distributions
 - Accelerated Distributions
 - Post-termination Distributions
 - Deferral Funding
 - CIC Distributions



AREAS OF CONCERN TO MANAGEMENT

- How to reduce the "cost" of stock options and/or increase their perceived value?
- How to avoid or ameliorate a fixed expense for options that results in no gain to employees?
- How to maintain broad-based equity incentives (e.g., ESPPs) under an option-expensing environment?
- How to introduce performance-based vesting for options and restricted stock in a cost- and valueeffective manner?
- How to introduce performance-based grant practices to reduce entitlement?



Competitive data used for illustrations . . .

- Comes from the F.W. Cook & Co. database
 - Generally, large-caps (i.e., Fortune 250)
 - But representative of broader public-company practice
- Values options based on the Binomial model and standard assumptions



CASH COMPENSATION LEVELS

More stable than long-term grant values . . .


- Salaries moving with the average market at 3.5% to 4%
 - 3.6% vs. 3.5% last year
 - 3.9% at executive level; 3.4% for non-union hourly
- Upward movement in annual bonuses
 - Higher payouts for 2005 performance
 - Combination of improved performance over 2004 and achievable goals
 - Also, pressure to increase target awards and upside leverage



LONG-TERM GRANT VALUES

Median LTI Value Yearly Percentage Growth from 2001-2004

■ FAS 123 Companies ■ Non-FAS 123 Companies






LONG-TERM GRANT VALUES

75th %ile has moved closer to the median . . .

CEO LTI Value at FAS 123 and Non-FAS 123 Companies 2002 - 2004






LONG-TERM MIX

Shift from options to full-value grants (i.e., restricted and performance stock/cash). . .


CEO Grant Type as a Percent of Total LTI Value 2002 - 2004






CHANGES IN LONG-TERM PRACTICES

Executive Long-Term Incentive Grant Type Usage—Percent of Top 250 Companies






Grant Type Usage at FAS 123 Companies vs. Non-FAS Companies





Other Grant Type Variations – Percent of Top 250 Companies





HIGH-PROFILE CHANGES

Examples of how long-term incentive programs are evolving . . .

Company	Recent Changes
Exxon Mobil	Eliminated options, added restricted stock, continuing cash performance units
Hewlett-Packard	Reduced options, added cash performance units
General Electric	Eliminated options for CEO, replaced with performance shares; converted options to stock-based SARs for other executives
IBM	Eliminated plain-vanilla options and introduced premium-priced options (FMV + 10%) for top 300 senior executives; to receive and vest in FMV options, must buy and hold shares for 3 years
Microsoft	Eliminated options, added performance shares for top 600 executives and restricted stock for other employees



SHARE USAGE AND DILUTION

Look carefully beyond the numbers . . .

- "Run rates" and "overhang" as percentages of outstanding shares are no longer meaningful
 - Because of shift from options to full-value
- Decline in numbers of shares granted and outstanding does not mean lower grant value and expense
- Market value transfer (MVT) is a more relevant reference point
 - MVT measures grant value as a percent of company market-capitalization value
 - This is how ISS determines the reasonableness of sharepool authorization requests



MVT Analysis Detail

		 2004
a	Options Granted	1,467,000
	Exchanged Options	-
	Net Options (a)	1,467,000
b	Wgt. Avg Ex. Price	\$ 16.51
c	Fair Value of Options Granted	\$ 11.06
d	Restricted/Performance Shares Granted	23,122
e	Fair/Grant Value per Share	\$ 17.26
	Fair Value - Grants	
f	Options (a*c)	\$ 16,227,514
g	Restricted/Performance Shares (d*e)	\$ 399,086
h	Performance Units	\$ -
i	Total $(f+g+h)$	\$ 16,626,600
j	Weighted Avg. Grant Price ((f/i)*b)+(g/i)*e)	\$ 16.53
k	Wgt. Avg. Basic Shares O/S	23,951,000
1	Wgt. Avg. Market Capitalization (j*k)	\$ 395,862,179
m	Market Value Transfer (i/l)	4.20%



OPTION PROVISIONS


More talk than action so far in adapting to new accounting rules . . .

- Race to the bottom in valuations for expensing
- Some early design impact
 - Terms from 10 years to 7 years
 - Reloads disappearing
 - Less flexible post-employment vesting and exercise periods
- Interest in performance vesting, but no major examples
- Expected movement toward stock-based SARs in limbo
 - Okay with IRS but not ISS



Executive Stock Option Features – Percent of Top 250 Companies

Executive Stock Option Features—Percent of Top 250 Companies







EXECUTIVE OWNERSHIP

Pressure from shareholder groups is increasing prevalence and enforcement sanctions . . .

	"Best Practice"	Reality
Ownership Guidelines	Real ownership of specified salary multiple or number of shares; usually after 5 years	About 70% of large caps and increasing; fewer small caps and techs or West of the Mississippi
Retention Guidelines	Hold net shares from compensation program for at least 1 year (i.e., no run-up and flipping)	GE, Citicorp, Lilly and a couple of other early adopters; few followers




Prevalence of Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines





Types of Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines





MISCELLANEOUS

More time will be spent on ...

- Setting goals for annual bonuses to better balance pay for performance and pay for results
- Valuing SERPs, above-market interest on deferred compensation, and severance arrangements
- Aligning outside directors' compensation with their current responsibilities and risks
 - And compensation committees again taking charge of directors' compensation, where it has moved to nominating/governance committees



TRY THIS APPROACH

	Alternative 1	Alternative 2	Alternative 3	Alternative 4
Senior Executives	Options – 50% Performance Shares/Cash – 50%	Options – 67% Restricted Stock – 33%	Options – 50% Performance Shares/ Cash – 50%	Performance Shares – 100%
Other LTI Participants	Options – 50% Performance Shares/ Cash or Restricted Stock – 50%	Options – 50% Restricted Stock – 50%	Performance Shares/Cash or Restricted Stock – 100%	Performance Shares or Restricted Stock – 100%



PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE

Key Principles

- 1. Limit non-variable components
 - Salary, perks
- 2. Emphasize variable elements
 - Payout and costs tied to results
- 3. Maintain accountability for failures
 - Avoid resets
- 4. Tie opportunity to operational and stock price results
- 5. Encourage executive ownership

Key Challenges

- 1. Discouraging "entitlement" mindset
- 2. Defining success
- 3. Selecting metrics
- 4. Setting target goals
 - Defining "reasonably achievable"
- 5. Ensuring affordability
- 6. Defining "market competitive"
- 7. Ensuring balance and durability
 - Financial vs. strategic goals
 - Mix of elements
- 8. Striving for perfection

Challenges and Issues



SETTING GRANT GUIDELINES

A new approach for determining long-term grant size is necessary but controversial . . .

Old Method

New Method

Determine competitive individual grant values

Convert to company shares (or cash)

Add individual grants to determine total grants

Start with competitive aggregate grant value as a percent of company market cap

Allocate to individuals based on competitive percent of total grant value



CONCLUSIONS

- Know the market environment and trends
- Look beyond the data
- Understand new and proposed regulations
- Listen to and anticipate shareholders
- Lead or follow



Appreciation Awards

<u>Stock Options</u> – Rights to purchase shares of company stock at a specified price over a stated period, usually 10 years or less; typically, the option price is 100 percent of market value at the time of grant, but can be more as in the case of premium stock options or less as in the case of discount stock options; may be granted in the form of tax-qualified incentive stock options (ISOs) or nonqualified stock options (NQSOs); variations of stock options include:

<u>Reload Stock Options</u> – (Sometimes referred to as "replacement" or "restoration" stock options) options that carry a feature under which new stock options are granted upon the stock-for-stock exercise of the original option; the reload option typically equals the number of shares tendered to exercise the original option, has an exercise price equal to the then-current fair market value of the company's stock, and is exercisable for the remaining term of the original option

<u>Performance Stock Options</u> – Options that have some aspect of their vesting subject to specified performance criteria; vesting can either be <u>accelerated by</u> or based <u>solely on</u> attainment of performance criteria

<u>Premium Stock Options</u> – Options that have an exercise price <u>above</u> market value at the time of grant

<u>Discount Stock Options</u> – Just the opposite of premium options, having an exercise price <u>below</u> market value at the time of grant

<u>Indexed Stock Options</u> – Options that have an <u>exercise price that may fluctuate</u> above or below market value at grant, depending on the company's stock price performance relative to a specified index or the movement of the index itself; indexed options differ from performance options in that the exercise price of indexed options typically remains variable until the option is exercised

<u>Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs)</u> – Rights to receive the increase since grant in the market price of company stock; actual payouts may be in stock or cash; variations of SARs include:

<u>Tandem SARs</u> – Rights to receive the gain on a stock option in lieu of exercising the option, with the exercise of one canceling the other

<u>Freestanding SARs</u> – Rights to receive the gain on a "phantom" stock option; freestanding SARs are granted independently from stock options and, therefore, the exercise of an option (if any) does not cancel the SAR



Full-Value Awards

<u>Restricted Stock</u> — Grants of actual shares of stock or stock units subject to restrictions and risk of forfeiture until vested solely by continued employment; typically, dividends or dividend rights are paid during the restriction period, either currently or credited and reinvested

<u>Performance Shares</u> — Grants of actual shares of stock or stock units whose payment is contingent on performance as measured against predetermined objectives over a multi-year period of time; same as restricted stock except that the shares are earned based on performance against objectives as well as continued employment; actual payouts may be in stock or cash

<u>Performance Accelerated Restricted Stock Award Plans (PARSAPs)</u> — Grants of restricted stock on which restrictions may lapse early based on performance as measured against predetermined objectives; if objectives are not realized, some or all restrictions lapse in time based solely on continued employment; also known as performance accelerated restricted stock (PARS) and time accelerated restricted stock award plans (TARSAPs)

Other Awards

<u>Performance Units</u> – Grants of cash allotments or dollar-denominated units whose payment or value is contingent on performance as measured against predetermined objectives over a multi-year period of time; unlike performance shares, the value paid does <u>not</u> fluctuate with stock price changes during the performance period; actual payouts may be in stock or cash

<u>Dividend Rights</u> – Rights to receive the equivalent of dividends paid on a specified number of company shares, and are usually granted in conjunction with other grant types, such as stock options or performance shares



- In contrast to appreciation-only grant types (i.e., stock options and SARs), full-value grants have value at the time of grant that varies thereafter based on Company performance and/or subsequent changes in stock price
- Outlined below is a description of the various types of full-value awards that may be used as a substitute for or in conjunction with stock options

Time-Vested Restricted Stock

- Grants of actual shares of stock or stock units in which vesting is based solely on continued service
 - Restricted shares may cliff vest after a specified period of time (e.g., 100% after 4 years), or vest ratably over a specified period of time (e.g., 25% each year for 4 years)
- Under FAS 123R, the value of the restricted stock on grant date is charged to earnings over the vesting period
- Participants pay ordinary income tax on the actual value of the shares at vesting; the Company receives a tax deduction in the same amount at the same time⁽¹⁾
- The Company has positive cash flow equal to the value of the tax deduction received upon vesting
- May be perceived negatively by shareholders as a "give-away" because of the absence of performance conditions on vesting

⁽¹⁾ Taxable income realized by executives who appear in the Company's proxy statement would not be deductible as performance-based compensation under Section 162(m) to the extent that, when combined with other non-performance-based pay (e.g., salary, taxable value of perquisites, etc.), it exceeds \$1 million in any year



Performance-Accelerated Restricted Stock

- Grants of actual shares of stock or stock units that cliff vest after a long period (e.g., after 7 years); however, vesting may be accelerated to an earlier date if predetermined performance goals are achieved
 - For example, if operating or net income goals are met annually, vesting of 20% of the award accelerates
 - If performance goals are not achieved, the unvested portion of the awards would be delayed until the service-based vesting date (i.e., the 7th anniversary of grant)
- Under Opinion 25, these awards have the advantage of preserving fixed grant date accounting treatment while incorporating performance conditions, but under FAS 123R, these awards are treated identically to traditional time-vested restricted stock (see above) and performance shares (see below)
- The participants pay ordinary income tax on the actual value of the shares at vesting; the Company receives a tax deduction in the same amount at the same time⁽²⁾
- Upon vesting, the Company has positive cash flow equal to the value of the tax deduction received

⁽²⁾ Taxable income realized by executives who appear in the Company's proxy statement would not be deductible as performance-based compensation under Section 162(m) to the extent that, when combined with other non-performance-based pay (e.g., salary, taxable value of perquisites, etc.), it exceeds \$1 million in any year



Performance Shares

- Grants of actual shares of stock or stock units, the same as restricted stock, but with vesting based on both continued service and the achievement of predetermined performance goals
 - Payouts vary based on changes in stock price and level of goal achievement
 - If the employee terminates prior to the end of the cycle or threshold performance objectives are missed, there is no gain to the employee (or cost to the Company)
- Performance goals are typically financial/operational targets set at the beginning of a multi-year performance period, but could relate to strategic objectives
 - Goals can be derived from the Company's long-term business plan or can be based on a fixed growth rate
 - Generally, the number of goals should be limited to no more than 2 or 3, since multiple goals tend to dilute focus and create complexity
- Participants are granted a target number of shares or share units at the beginning of the performance cycle
 - Shorter cycles, e.g., 12 to 24 months, are becoming more prevalent, reflecting the difficulties of setting long-term goals, with payment made in restricted stock subject to vesting based on continued service
- The number of shares earned at the end of the cycle may be higher or lower than target based on actual performance



Performance Shares

- Payout is usually in shares but may be in cash, with an opportunity to defer to a future date (at participant's election) if in the form of share units
- Under FAS 123R, the market value on the date of grant of the performance shares ultimately earned is charged to earnings over the performance cycle (i.e., expense is not affected by share price variability during the performance cycle like under APB 25), assuming awards are delivered in shares
 - Performance shares are a better vehicle than time-vested restricted stock or performance-accelerated restricted stock under FAS 123R, because they receive fixed accounting treatment but are completely performance-contingent (i.e., costs are calibrated with Company performance)
 - Note that if payment is in cash, cost under FAS 123R is variable and equals the amount actually distributed to the participant (as opposed to the value of the shares at grant)
- Participants pay ordinary income tax on the actual value of the shares at payout; the Company receives a tax deduction in the same amount at the same time⁽³⁾
- Payment in shares creates positive cash flow equal to the tax deduction received, but creates shareholder dilution
- Payment in cash creates a cash flow cost equal to the earn-out minus the value of the tax deduction, but avoids shareholder dilution

⁽³⁾ Note that since the program is completely performance-based, there is no risk of lost deductions under Section 162(m) (assuming the plan is administered properly). This is another benefit relative to restricted stock and performance-accelerated restricted stock



Performance Units

- Grants of cash or dollar-denominated units in which the payout is based on the achievement of predetermined performance goals, the same as described above for performance shares
 - The amount of the payout is <u>not</u> influenced by changes in stock price, although the earnout may be delivered in either cash or shares (with opportunity to defer payout to a future date at participant's election)
- The number or value of the units earned at the end of the cycle may be higher or lower based on actual performance
- The estimated value of the payout is accrued quarterly over the performance cycle and trued-up at the end of the cycle
- Participants pay ordinary income tax on the actual value of the units at payout; the Company receives a tax deduction in the same amount at the same time⁽⁴⁾
- Payment in shares creates positive cash flow equal to the tax deduction received, but creates shareholder dilution
- Payment in cash creates a cash flow cost equal to the earn-out minus the value of the tax deduction, but avoids shareholder dilution

⁽⁴⁾ Note that since the program is completely performance-based, there is no risk of lost deductions under Section 162(m) (assuming the plan is administered properly)



Summary of Characteristics

A summary comparison of "plain vanilla" stock options versus the full-value LTI alternatives on seven important characteristics is contained in the table shown below

	"Plain Vanilla" Stock Options	Time-Based Restricted Stock	Performance- Accelerated Restricted Stock	Performance Shares	
Positive Shareholder Optics	Low, due to perceived absence of performance goals and lack of downside risk	Lowest, due to absence of performance goals and receipt of value even if price drops	Moderate, but less than Performance Shares or Units	High	High
Risk/Reward "Leverage"	High	Low	Low	Moderate	Low
Increased Focus on Operational Performance	Low	Low	Moderate	High	High
Linkage to Ownership Objectives	Moderate	High	High	Moderate/High	Low, unless paid in shares
Accounting Cost – FAS 123 Relative to Opinion 25	Higher	Same	Same	Lower, if paid in stock and price increases	Same
Potential Share Dilution Relative to Options	N/A	Lower	Lower	Lower	Lower
Absolute Share Dilution Relative to Options	N/A	Higher	Higher	Indeterminable	Indeterminable

Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc. provides management compensation consulting services to business clients. Formed in 1973, our firm has served over 1,500 corporations in a wide variety of industries from our offices in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Our primary focus is on performance-based compensation programs which help companies attract and retain key employees, motivate and reward them for improved performance, and align their interests with shareholders. Our range of consulting services encompasses the following areas:

•	Total	Com	pensation	Reviews
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- Strategic Incentives
- Specific Plan Reviews
- Restructuring Services
- Competitive Comparisons

- Incentive Grant Guidelines
- Executive Ownership Programs
- All-Employee Plans
- Directors' Compensation
- Equity Instruments

- Performance Measurement
- Globalization
- Privatization
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Our offices are located:

New York	Chicago	Los Angeles	London
90 Park Avenue	One North Franklin	2121 Avenue of the Stars	Thru our affiliation with: New Bridge Street Consultants 20 Little Britain London, EC1A 7DH 020-7282-3030 phone 020-7282-0011 fax www.nbsc.co.uk
35 th Floor	Suite 910	Suite 990	
New York, New York 10016	Chicago, Illinois 60606	Los Angeles, California 90067	
212-986-6330 phone	312-332-0910 phone	310-277-4852 phone	
212-986-3836 fax	312-332-0647 fax	310-277-5068 fax	

Jeffrey M. Kanter jmkanter@fwcook.com

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